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Abstract
We discuss here conceptual change and the formation of robust
learning outcomes from the viewpoint of complex dynamic
systems, where students’ conceptions are seen as context de-
pendent and multifaceted structures which depend on the con-
text of their application. According to this view the conceptual
patterns (i.e. intuitive conceptions) may be robust in a cer-
tain situation but are not formed, at last not as robust ones, in
another situation. The stability is then thought to arise dynami-
cally in a variety of ways and not so much mirror rigid ontolog-
ical categories or static intuitive conceptions. We use compu-
tational modelling in understanding the generic dynamic and
emergent features of that phenomenon. The model shows how
context dependence, described here through structure of epis-
temic landscape, leads to formation of context dependent ro-
bust states. The sharply defined nature of these states makes
learning to appear as a progression of switches from state to
another, given appearance of conceptual change as switch from
one robust state to another.
Keywords: Conceptual change; concept learning; epistemic
landscape; simulations
Introduction
Learning scientific knowledge where learners initial, intuitive
concepts gradually change towards more scientific ones is
known as conceptual change. Conceptual change as an ex-
pression for such learning emphasizes the clear transition or
even revolutionary-like transformation of learners knowledge
during the learning process (Duit & Treagust, 2003; Ozdemir
& Clark, 2007; Rusanen, 2014). The recently suggested com-
plex dynamic systems view on conceptual change instead of
such a picture views students’ conceptions as multifaceted
structures which depend on the context of their application.
In the dynamic systems view the conceptual patterns (i.e. in-
tuitive conceptions) may be robust in a certain situation but
are not formed, at last not as robust ones, in another situ-
ation. The stability is then thought to arise dynamically in
a variety of ways rather than mirroring rigid preconceptions
or static intuitive conceptions (Brown, 2014; Gupta, Ham-
mer, & Redish, 2010; Koponen, 2013; Koponen & Kokkonen,
2014). What we think as intuitive conceptions may be in fact
so strongly dependent on context, instructional settings and
individual learning history that such conceptions should be
approached as emergent cognitive epiphenomena, which are
situational and mirror partially the targeted scientific mod-
els forming the basis of the design of instructional settings.
In what follows, we refer to such epiphenomenal conceptual
structures simply as students explanatory schemes. In this
study we discuss how the dynamic systemic view may change
our ideas how conceptual change may accrue from emergent
robust learning outcomes. As a concrete example of learning
we consider direct current (DC) electrical circuits and empir-
ical results obtained in that context (Koponen & Kokkonen,
2014; Kokkonen & Mäntylä, 2017). In this case the target
knowledge and learning situation can be modelled as learn-
ing a tiered structure of explanatory schemes, where students
are expected to learn a simple set of concepts and relational
schemes between the concepts. The model is highly simpli-
fied and idealized, but it shows how context dependence, de-
scribed here through structure of epistemic landscape, leads
to formation of context dependent robust learning outcomes.
Due to sharply defined nature of these states, learning ap-
pears as a progression of switches from state to another, giv-
ing appearance of conceptual change as switch from one pre-
existing robust state to another, instead of gradual dynamic
change.
Empirical cases modelled
The research of learning DC-circuits has revealed that
the students tend to use very similar types of explana-
tory schemes. Some researchers of conceptual change at-
tribute these schemes to pre-existing ontological commit-
ments, while some others see them more context dependent
and possibly even artefacts of the empirical research setting
(Brown, 2014; Gupta et al., 2010; Koponen, 2013; Koponen
& Kokkonen, 2014). Nevertheless, most empirical studies
have revealed very similar collections of explanatory schemes
although there are differences in details (see (Ozdemir &
Clark, 2007; Gupta et al., 2010; Koponen & Kokkonen, 2014;
Kokkonen & Mäntylä, 2017) and references therein). The
empirical data used here as starting point consists of three dif-
ferent contexts I-III (Koponen & Kokkonen, 2014; Kokkonen
& Mäntylä, 2017):
• I: Light bulbs in series. Two variants (a single light bulb
and two light bulbs) in terms of the brightness of the bulbs
are compared. This comparison consists of events e1 and
e2.
• II: Light bulbs in parallel. The first variant is again involves
a single light bulb. The second variant involves two light
bulbs in parallel. Comparisons yield events e′1 and e
′
2.
• III: Comparison of the brightness of light bulbs in series (I)
and in parallel (II). In the first variant, participants compare
the brightness of light bulbs in series, and parallel circuits
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to the one-bulb case only. In the second variant, partici-
pants compare series and parallel cases to each other. This
yields events e′′1 and e
′′
2 .
All six different types of events are referred to as an event















representing observations of the brightness of a single light
bulb in each context (the brightest light bulb). This set thus
describes (formally) the task and how it was sequenced and
how students progressed from context to I to III. In what fol-
lows ε is treated as exogenous variable describing the event
set, scaled to range ε ∈ [0,1] where 1 represent full set of
events. Further details about the empirical setup, design and
excerpts from the student interviews are reported elsewhere
(Koponen & Kokkonen, 2014; Kokkonen & Mäntylä, 2017).
When details are put aside, in all cases one finds similar types
of explanatory schemes ,listed and characterised in Table I.
Table 1: The explanatory schemes mk inferred from the em-
pirical studies (Koponen, 2013; Kokkonen & Mäntylä, 2017).
Model Description
m1 The battery as a source of electricity
(current or voltage).
m2 m1+ components consume electricity
(current or voltage).
m3 m2+ voltage/current over components
creates/needs current/voltage.
m4 m3 refined as scheme based on Ohms law
+ Kirchhoffs laws KI and KII.
m5 m4+components consume electric
energy/power (Joule’s law)
Explanatory schemes m1 and m2 are well-known electric
current-based intuitive explanatory schemes found in many
empirical studies (Koponen & Kokkonen, 2014; Kokkonen
& Mäntylä, 2017), while m3 is partially correct explanation,
which takes into account the role of components in determin-
ing the current. Finally, schemes m4 and m5 are complete and
correct (scientific) schemes. The determination schemes D1
and D2 constraints (Kirchhoff’s I and II laws, respectively)
and D3 is relational scheme (Ohm’s law) regulating the rela-
tionship between the pertinent concepts (voltage and current).
A more detailed description of these cases and their repre-
sentation are given elsewhere (Koponen & Kokkonen, 2014;
Kokkonen & Mäntylä, 2017) and are not reproduced here.
The structure of explanatory schemes can be schematically
represented as in Fig. 1 as the generic tiered system, where
more sophisticated explanatory schemes are at the highest
tiers and the less sophisticated schemes at lower tiers can be
seen as incomplete or partial versions of the higher tier ex-
planatory schemes.
The simulation model
The task we discuss here involves five explanatory schemes
with ascending complexity and can thus be represented as
Figure 1: A Tiered system of five explanatory schemes. The
different hierarchical levels consist of explanatory schemes
m1 - m5 of ascending level of complexity and expanding cov-
erage of explanatory power. The symbols C1 and C2 are con-
cepts (current and voltage) entering the models m1-m5.
a tiered structure shown in Fig. 1.The tiered system of ex-
planatory schemes can be represented as an epistemic land-
scape, which is an abstract representation of the explanatory
power of explanatory schemes. Such descriptions have been
previously used in studies describing the cognitive and so-
cial effects of discovery and knowledge foraging (Weisberg
& Muldoon, 2009; McKenzie, Himmelreich, & Thompson,
2015). Learning is then described as foraging for best ex-
palining scheme in that landscape, based on utility guided
probabilistic selection of the best explaining scheme.
Epistemic landscape
A tiered system of explanatory schemes consists of schemes
mk, k=1,2,...,5, in which the hierarchical level k is defined
according to the complexity of the scheme. More com-
plex schemes require greater proficiency from the user of the
scheme, such as mathematical proficiency in deriving predic-
tions from the scheme or making deductions based on it. The
utility of a given scheme can be seen as a trade-off measure
between the scheme’s complexity and the amount of events
which the learner needs to explain. The scheme m1 is sim-
ple and, thus, its utility for a simple set of events is high, but
decreases for many events to be explained. The scheme m5
is the most complex one and requires great proficiency. Be-
cause it is complex to use, it has low utility in simple cases,
but its utility increases with accumulation of events.
The system of explanatory schemes, as far as the explana-
tory power of schemes for given set of events is in focus, can
be represented in idealized form of epistemic landscape. The
epistemic landscape is a simplified description how increased
information (in form of events) gives cues to select a given
model, and on the other hand, it describes how much pro-
ficiency is required in using the model. There is at present
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no detailed way to derive the epistemic landscape from the
graph as described in Fig. 1 and the connection remains a
qualitative one. With these restrictions, however, the epis-
temic landscape can be constructed by using utility functions
uk(ε,κ), which describe the epistemic utility of schemes mk.
The detailed forms of the functions are, fortunately, not im-
portant here; it is enough that they can serve to describe the
assumed generic features of the tiered system. Therefore, the
mathematical description of the epistemic landscape adopted
here is based on a set of suitably flexible functions. Con-
venient mathematical forms that are easy to use in simula-
tions because the cumulative probability finction is invert-
ible are provided by MinMax-distributions (Kumaraswamy-
distributions) (Jones, 2009) as given in Table 1. The epis-
temic landscape thus consists of five manifolds of which Fig.
2 show the schemes with the greatest utility in a given region.
Table 2: The utility functions uk(ε,κ) forming the epistemic
landscape. The normalization factors N1-N5 are defined so
that maximum value of each utility function is 1. The func-
tions fn,m(x) = xm(1− xm−1)n−m are MinMax-distributions
(Kuwaraswamy-distributions).
State Utility function
m1 u1(ε,κ) = N1 fn1,m1(ε) fn′1,m′1(κ)
m2 N2[a1u1(ε,κ)+a2 fn2,m2(ε) fn′2,m′2(κ)]
m3 N3[b1u2(ε,κ)+b2 fn3,m3(ε) fn′3,m′3(κ)]
m4 N4[c1u3(ε,κ)+ c2 fn4,m4(ε) fn′4,m′4(κ)]
m5 N5[d1u4(ε,κ)+d2 fn5,m5(ε) fn′5,m′5(κ)]
Learning as foraging
The model of learning introduced here assumes that learn-
ing takes place as foraging for explanation schemes across
the epistemic landscape. We assume that foraging is guided
simply by the topography of the epistemic landscape, as a
”hill climbing” (HC) in the direction of the steepest change of
the gradient of the landscape (McKenzie et al., 2015; Weis-
berg & Muldoon, 2009). When exogenous parameter ε in-
creases by δε (a new event or cue becomes available), the
agent selects the most probable explanatory scheme from the
neighborhood of its current state either by switching the state,
”uphilling” by increasing the proficiency or, if more advan-
tageous, ”downhilling” by decreasing the proficiency. Pro-
ficiency is taken here as a skill-like property. A response
to success and failure is modelled as logistic development
(Steenbeck & Van Geert, 2007; Van Geert, 2014) of learner’s
proficiency during the learning process in form
κ← κ±µκ(1−κ) (1)
where µ is the effect of memory of success or failure. Here,
success means that during foraging learner has upphilled, i.e.
moved to direction of increased utility, failure, on the other
hand, means that learner has downhilled, moved towards de-
creased utility.
Figure 2: The epistemic landscape corresponding to explana-
tory models from m1 to m5 as indicated in space spanned by
events consisting of events ε and learner’s proficiency κ. The
contours are shown for values 0.95, 0.90, 0.86, 0.82, 0.78,
0.74, 0.70, 0.67, 0.60, 0.55, 0.50.
Selection of explanatory scheme
The learners are assumed to select the best explanatory
scheme mk, one at a time, on basis how its utility compares to
utilities of other schemes. The probability Pk that scheme mk
is selected is based on probabilistic decision theory (Laciana
& Oteiza-Aguirre, 2014; Yukalov & Sornette, 2014) and is
given as
Pk =
uk exp [ βuk ]
∑ j 6=k u j exp [ βu j ]
(2)
where β is parameter related to the confidence of choice, β
1 indicating low confidence (i.e. high noise or randomness)
and β 1 high confidence (i.e. low noise or randomness). In
what follows, we use β= 5 which represents high confidence.
Implementation of simulations
The control (exogenous) variable is event ε. The output (en-
dogenous) variables are the selected explanatory scheme mk
and the learner’s proficiency κ, which changes dynamically
as a part of the learning process. The output variables depend
on the parameters, which are the confidence β and memory µ.
The learning process as foraging across the epistemic land-
scape is simulated based on the probability of explanatory
scheme selection Pk in Eq. (2). At each instant when the
value of ε increases by δε (here δε = 0.01), it is decided
whether: 1) the model switch happens, or 2) proficiency in-
creases, decreases or remains unchanged. Both of these three
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steps are characterised by a set of probabilities, and event se-
lection is carried out by the roulette wheel -method (Lipowski
& Lipowska, 2012). In the roulette wheel -method a discrete
set of N possible events k with probabilities pk are arranged
with cumulative probability Φk = ∑ki=1 pi/∑
N
i=1 pi. The event
k is selected if random number 0 < r < 1 falls in the slot
Φk−1 < r < Φk. In case 1) the probabilities pk are given by
Eq. (5) and pk = Pk with k = 1,2,3. In case 2) one has three
probabilities p1 = Pk′(ε+δε,κ), p2 = Pk′(ε+δε,κ+δκ) and
p3 = Pk′(ε+δε,κ−δκ) for any given scheme mk′ . All simu-
lations are carried out for equally distributed set of all initial
values of κ, for 100 steps with δε = 0.01 and δκ = 0.01 in a
mesh of 100x100 points and for 9000 repetitions.
Results
The outcome of the simulations applied in case of learning the
tiered theory structure is number density nk of choice of given
scheme mk at given values of ε and κ. The number density nk
is related to likelihood that in an ensemble of students a given
student holds the explanatory scheme mk. In case a large set
of students’ explanatory schemes are collected in an empiri-
cal research the density nk would correspond the distribution
of how different finding are classified in different categories,
categories then roughly corresponding the peaks in the den-
sity distribution, while the slight differences in empirically
found categories would corresponding the diffuse spread of
seen in the density distribution. This association of empirical
findings is not exact, of course, but provides a close enough
interpretation of the density plots. Note that all density plots
are shown as contour plots as in topographical maps.
The shift to hold or select more advanced schemes during
the learning (or training sequence) when ε increases from ε =0
(no events to be explained) to ε=1 (all events to be explained)
is particularly clear when density nk of selected schemes in
the (ε,κ)-space is examined. Such density distributions nk of
preferred schemes are shown in Fig. 3 for strong (µ=0.05), in-
termediate (µ=0.02), and weak (µ=0.01) memory effects. Re-
sults are shown only for cases that initially have proficiencies
0.45 < κ < 0.55 which represents a middle cohort of initial
proficiencies, thus representing the assumed average student
for which the learning task is designed. The results shown
in Fig. 3 demonstrate how selection of given schemes k ac-
cumulate to certain regions, different from but close to those
regions where utilities (see Fig. 2) have peak values. These
regions are shown as dark color in the figures, the darker the
shade the higher the density. The dark regions where den-
sities accumulate are the robust outcomes of learning. This
behaviour is due to dynamic effects of foraging for best ex-
planatory schemes in the epistemic landscape and how mem-
ory affects the development of proficiency.
The density distribution shows directly how likely a selec-
tion of given explanatory scheme is in comparison to other
schemes. When the memory is weak (µ = 0.01) the low-level
schemes m1 and m2 are likely to be selected throughout the
learning sequence. In addition, scheme m3 is present through-
out the learning sequence because it is the most preferred ini-
tial scheme for mid-cohort learners. When memory increases
from µ =0.01 to 0.05 the dynamic evolution becomes more
interesting. In the intermediate stage of learning (stage II)
scheme m4 begins to compete with m3 and finally, in the end
of the learning stage scheme m5 is dominant. For the highest
memory µ=0.05 the development becomes very predictable.
Schemes m1 and m2 are likely choices only at low proficien-
cies, and finally, in the end of the training sequence ε ¿ 0.6 the
scheme m5 is dominant. For high memory-effects and high
confidence the robust learning outcomes are sharply defined,
island- like and give expression of well-focused explanatory
schemes with no overlap with other explanatory schemes.
The overall picture is then that when new event becomes
available, learner switches to better explaining schemes to-
wards the end of the learning sequence. This is the successful
learning path.
In high memory region, however, the polarization of learn-
ing outcomes happens; with increased preference of high
level schemes m5 also the preference for low level schemes
m1 and m2 tend to increase. This is due to fact that suc-
cess and failure affect in similar way and have equally strong
memory-effect.; success feeds success but similarly also fail-
ure feeds failure. Of course, were the memory effect asym-
metric, stronger memory effect for success than for failure,
such polarization would disappear.
Discussion and conclusions
In the complex systems view of conceptual change suggested
here the formation of robust learning outcomes accrues from
foraging on epistemic landscape, which represent the target
knowledge as it is contained in the designed learning task.
The interplay of learner’s cognitive dynamics and the target
knowledge as it appears in the design of the learning tasks
leads to formation of stable and dense regions of preferred
explanatory schemes in epistemic landscape. The origin of
these robust states is on the learning dynamics and how it
interacts with the context (structure of the learning task).
In some cases, depending on the learner’s proficiency and
the development of the proficiency, learning outcomes may
match the target knowledge, but in some other cases, may
fall short of targeted outcomes. However, even those states,
which do not match the targeted states, are robust, thus giv-
ing impression of pre-existing conceptual states of learner, as
assumed in traditional conceptual change models. Accumu-
lation of densities nk in certain regions are those areas, where
empirical findings will be likely to associate the dynamically
formed epiphenomenal robust state with a certain assumed
misconception or pre-existing intuitive conception. If this
interpretation is correct, the vision of conceptual change as
switch between cognitively pre-existing static states to an-
other needs to be revised and replaced by a more dynamic
and fluid picture of dynamically formed robust but yet epiphe-
nomenal states.
In the present study, the picture of conceptual change as
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Figure 3: The effect of memory µ on explanatory scheme selection n when events unfold (described as an increasing number
of events ε). The cases with memory µ=0.01, 0.02 and 0.05 are shown. The range κ ∈ [0.45,0.55] of initial proficiencies are
considered (mid-cohort). The contours are shown for probabilities P = 0.80, 0.70, 0.50, 0.25, 0.15, 0.10, 0.05, 0.02, 0.01,
0.0050, 0.0025. The number of repetitions for each of 100x100 data points is 9000.
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switch from intuitive conceptions to more scientific concep-
tions (or sometimes, to other intuitive conception) emerges as
rapid but continuous dynamic development of one robust state
to another state rather than as abrupt and discontinuous switch
from one pre-existing static state to another. Moreover, such
states are seen as epiphenomenal outcomes of interplay be-
tween learning dynamics and task design, rather than inde-
pendent construct of mind, rooted in cognitively fundamen-
tal, e.g. substance-based ontological categories. The fact that
for most of the training sequence there is little overlap be-
tween the different robust epiphenomenal states and periods
of clearly continuous change are short, a picture of discontin-
uous switch from robust state to another is obvious. Super-
ficially the course of events in the present model correspond
the traditional view of conceptual change but the difference
in interpretation of the underlying dynamics and nature of
states in present view is fundamentally different from the tra-
ditional one; the present view strongly suggests that behind
the observed behaviour is after all continuous learning dy-
namics and which, through designed epistemic landscape, is
essentially context dependent.
In summary, the dynamic view provides fresh viewpoint
on conceptual change and suggest new ways to conceptualise
it. The results we have provided here are far from conclusive
and are at best only suggestive, but we think that the view
proposed here of learning outcomes as context dependent, dy-
namically robust but ultimately emergent epiphenomena de-
serves closer attention and prompts us to design very differ-
ent empirical research settings. We expect that the main use
of the abstract computational model as introduced here is on
its potential uses in guiding attention in interdependencies of
task structure and learning outcome, and in helping to focus
on dynamic, time dependent features of conceptual change in
empirical research settings.
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